NATO and the Man of Chaos in the Oval Office: Trump's dislike of the North Atlantic alliance"

This is a slightly expanded and revised English version of an essay first published in the German daily newspaper 'Koelner Stadtanzeiger' on April 13, 2026.

On September 12, 2001—the day after al-Qaeda’s attacks on the United States—NATO convened an emergency meeting in Brussels and took an unprecedented step. For the first and only time in its history, the alliance invoked Article 5: an attack on one member would be treated as an attack on all.

The response was immediate and unequivocal. All 18 allies closed ranks behind Washington, deployed aircraft to protect U.S. airspace, and soon supported American operations in Afghanistan. From 2003 to 2014, NATO assumed command of the ISAF protection force under a UN mandate and helped train Afghan security forces. Even during the controversial Iraq War—widely regarded by many EU countries as illegal and unnecessary—European governments agreed to a NATO advisory mission.

Today, Donald Trump wants to hear none of this. NATO, he has repeatedly claimed, is never there when the United States needs it. Trump has never concealed his dislike of the alliance. His former national security adviser, John Bolton, reports that Trump seriously considered withdrawing from NATO at the 2018 summit and had to be dissuaded with difficulty. For years, Trump has rightly criticized what he sees as the inadequate defense spending of many member states, arguing that they have long relied on—and taken advantage of—the United States.

At a more fundamental level, Trump rejects international organizations and multilateral frameworks altogether. Rather than engaging with NATO, the EU, or G7 forums, he favors bilateral relationships and negotiations in which the United States can more easily assert dominance.

Trump’s NATO criticism is increasing

Since the beginning of his second term in January 2025, Trump’s criticism has intensified further. There are now scarcely any pro-European voices left in his inner circle. Although he was briefly mollified by NATO members’ agreement at the June 2025 NATO summit in The Hague to raise defense spending to five percent of GDP, his frustration quickly returned—particularly in response to resistance against his plans to annex Greenland. He remains entirely serious about this objective. Only days ago, he again expressed outrage at Denmark and other NATO countries about his ambition to enlarge the territory of the U.S. by almost 22 per cent.

After what he perceived as a lack of allied support for his bombing campaign against Iran, Trump appears to have reached a breaking point. He had not anticipated the extent of Iran’s resistance and was caught off guard by the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and the ensuing global energy crisis—despite prior warnings from his Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Trump stands with his back to the wall and feels abandoned by his allies. He refuses to accept their argument that NATO, as a defensive alliance, should not be drawn into a war of aggression. Several countries—including Spain and Italy, as well as initially the United Kingdom—denied overflight rights and access to bases for U.S. operations against Iran.

Nor were European governments willing to deploy warships to the Strait of Hormuz to escort tankers. They argued that such a mission would be excessively dangerous and beyond the capabilities of many European states. Instead, they maintained that the Iran war was not theirs and signaled a willingness to offer support only once hostilities had ceased. Trump responded in kind, declaring that the war in Ukraine was not his war either—and warned of serious consequences.

In recent weeks, Trump has repeatedly raised the prospect of withdrawing the United States from NATO. The idea surfaced again both ahead of his recent address to the nation and during the visit of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, even if it was not formally announced.

Through flattery and deferential rhetoric, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has sought to avert the worst—most recently just last week. Yet his conciliatory tone is increasingly viewed with skepticism among NATO partners. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer stated bluntly that he had “had enough” of the way both Trump and Putin contribute to volatility in global energy prices. Such a direct juxtaposition of Trump and Putin would have been unthinkable within NATO until very recently.

A weakened alliance even without full withdrawal

The future of the alliance in its current form is in question. Could Trump withdraw unilaterally? He appears to believe so. In reality, however, the U.S. Congress passed legislation in December 2023 requiring either a separate law or a two-thirds majority in the Senate for any withdrawal. One of the key initiators of this legislation was Republican Senator Marco Rubio—now Secretary of State and a supporter of Trump’s criticism of NATO.

Yet even without a formal withdrawal, Trump could significantly erode U.S. engagement and thus undermine the perceived strength of the alliance. He could scale back participation at NATO headquarters in Brussels, close the U.S. mission, or remove the Supreme Allied Commander Europe—traditionally an American officer. He could also reduce the U.S. military presence in Europe. At present, approximately 80,000 U.S. troops are stationed there, including around 40,000 in Germany alone.

Congress has stipulated in the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act, however, that at least 76,000 active-duty U.S. troops need to remain on European soil. Should troop levels fall below this threshold for more than 45 days, the Secretary of Defense must notify Congress and certify that such a move is consistent with U.S. national security interests and that NATO allies have been fully consulted. Nevertheless, during his first term, Trump ordered the withdrawal of 12,000 troops from Germany—a decision later reversed by the Biden administration.

The crucial importance of U.S. backing

A particularly severe blow would occur if the United States were to declare that it no longer considered itself bound by Article 5 or chose to withdraw its nuclear umbrella from Europe. NATO might continue to exist in formal terms, but in practice it would be profoundly weakened. Without U.S. backing, Vladimir Putin and other potentially hostile countries would take the alliance far less seriously.

Trump is also acutely aware of Europe’s Achilles’ heel: Ukraine. He already curtailed U.S. support last year. Weapons and ammunition are now sold—often at considerable cost —through NATO’s “Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List” (PURL) to European states, which then deliver them for free to Ukraine. Trump may well be considering further reductions.

He could also suspend the sharing of intelligence and satellite data. The real-time information essential to Ukraine’s war effort—on Russian troop movements, targeting data for precision strikes, and damage assessments—would no longer be available. Even Elon Musk’s Starlink communication system could come under review.

All of this helps explain why few European leaders are willing to confront Trump openly. Frustration with the “man of chaos” in the Oval Office runs deep across the alliance. Yet the risks of direct confrontation remain prohibitive. Without U.S. military support, Ukraine cannot prevail. For that reason, NATO allies—led by Rutte—are pursuing a strategy of delay, hoping to outlast Trump and anticipating that a future U.S. administration will restore greater reliability to American foreign policy and reaffirm the value of NATO. But that moment may still be two long years away—if not more.