The Trump-Xi Summit in Beijing: China Wants to Buy Time, Trump Wishes to Shine

This is the slightly revised English version of an essay which was first published in German in the German edition of "China Table Briefing" on May 13, 2026 (original link below).

The summit between Trump and Xi comes at a time when the world is in crisis mode. While both sides project strength to the outside world, Beijing and Washington are locked in a struggle over economic dependencies, technology, and geopolitical influence.

The summit between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping, which begins on Wednesday, May 13, 2026, is taking place amid a period of profound geopolitical and economic upheaval. An end to the war in Iran and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz are not in sight. Even with an immediate ceasefire, months of supply chain disruptions can be expected.

Both sides are under considerable domestic and economic pressure. In the U.S., rising gas prices and a growing inflation rate have pushed Trump’s approval ratings down to around 33 percent. The outcome of the midterm elections in November 2026 is increasingly uncertain for the Republicans.

China continues to grapple with the effects of the real estate collapse of recent years. Although export volumes unexpectedly rose by over 14 percent in April 2026, the Chinese economy is increasingly reliant on exports, as domestic consumption has declined sharply. This, however, is leading to growing resistance in many countries around the world - including not least in the U.S. and Europe - that are being flooded with Chinese products of all kinds. Despite generous oil reserves, which Beijing has always been careful to maintain, prices in China are rising and stocks are rapidly dwindling.

The U.S.-China rivalry continues

Both China and the U.S. recognize the importance of personal summit diplomacy. Since their meeting in South Korea in October 2025, the tension in bilateral relations has calmed down somewhat. But the areas of conflict remain: trade policy, artificial intelligence, chips and semiconductors, robotics, the automotive industry, Taiwan and the South China sea —in all these areas, and in many others, both sides are watching each other with eagle eyes.

The race for the technology of the future is in full swing. The fact that China is clearly ahead in dominating the mining and refining of many rare earth elements intensifies this further.

The relationship is also strained by the wars in Ukraine and Iran. Washington is trying to prevent China from providing ever-greater support to Russia’s military machine. A few days ago, the State Department imposed sanctions on three major Chinese companies that had passed on to Iran satellite information about the location of American ships and the missile equipment at U.S. military bases in the Middle East. The Trump administration assumes that the Chinese state is ultimately behind these companies or at least politically tolerates their activities.

Beijing’s perception

In China, Trump’s erratic and contradictory foreign policy is viewed with disbelief and incomprehension. The same applies to the military campaign in Iran, which took the leadership in Beijing by surprise. They had expected surgical strikes, not a full-scale conflagration.

Europe could seize this historic moment to make a credible offer. For the Gulf states’ disappointment with the U.S.—which is at least undermining the long-established petrodollar system—is being closely monitored in Beijing. Offers from China to the Gulf states will follow and the EU should not exclude itself from being part of the solution to the Iran crisis.

Essentially, since the Great Recession of 2008/09, Beijing has been convinced that the U.S. is on the decline. In light of Trump’s incoherent policies, this process appears to have accelerated from China’s perspective. It can therefore be assumed that Xi will adopt a tough negotiating stance at the Beijing summit.

Washington’s perception

Trump seems to be unaware of the weakness of his own policies and leadership style. He still believes he is in the strongest position in global politics, not only vis-à-vis Iran and other countries, but also regarding China. Furthermore, Trump is highly susceptible to theatrics, compliments, and superficial deference many Chinese officials will inundate him with though Xi Jinping is likely to maintain his usual distanced and stoical demeanor. Still, Trump is fully aware that against the backdrop of the upcoming midterm elections and the economic burdens of the Iran war, he can hardly afford another trade war with China.

Added to this is the open question of how long the U.S. dollar will continue to function as the reserve currency. Rumors that Iran intends to charge tolls for the Strait of Hormuz in the Chinese renminbi may be symbolic in nature. Nevertheless, the petrodollar model—in which Gulf states invest their profits in U.S. Treasury bonds in exchange for military support—has lost a great deal of credibility.

All of this means that Trump ultimately finds himself in a weaker negotiating position vis-à-vis China – despite Trump and the U.S. delegation perceiving the situation very differently. Yet, as in many other areas, Trump’s policy toward China is characterized by wishful thinking and a lack of clarity and realism.

The authors:

Klaus W. Larres is the Richard M. Krasno Distinguished Professor and teaches as a professor of history and international relations at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Among other roles, he served as senior political advisor at the German Embassy in Beijing for Ambassador Michael Clauß.

Tim Wenniges is Deputy Executive Director of Unternehmer Baden-Württemberg e. V. Previously, he headed the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in China, among other roles.

Original link to the essay in German in China Table Briefing, 13 May 2026:

https://table.media/china/tablestandpunkt/gipfeltreffen-china-will-zeit-gewinnen-trump-will-glaenzen