Trump's War: key questions remain unanswered
This is an expanded and revised English version of an essay first published in the German daily newspaper 'Kölner Stadtanzeiger' on March 5, 2026.
Winston Churchill is often credited with the remark that one can rely on the United States to eventually do the right thing—after trying everything else first. Donald Trump’s government initially spent weeks conducting half-hearted negotiations with Iran, only to lose patience last Saturday and order bombing raids. What Trump plans to try next remains unclear. Washington appears to lack a coherent war plan.
Even basic contingencies seem to have been overlooked. Americans stranded in the Middle East and the Gulf states—including many tourists—have received little assistance. The State Department has advised them to return to the United States on scheduled flights, despite the fact that airspace across much of the region is closed and commercial flights are scarce.
More striking still, Trump has yet to address the nation to explain how he intends to conduct the war or what political objectives he seeks to achieve. Such a speech is urgently needed. Only about 27 percent of Americans support the war, while nearly 60 percent oppose it. Skepticism is also widespread within Trump’s own MAGA movement and among Republican members of Congress. The administration briefed the Congressional Intelligence Committee only last Tuesday—even though under the U.S. Constitution the authority to declare war rests with Congress.
The central questions therefore remain unanswered: Why was the war started? How will it be fought? How will it end? And who will govern Iran afterwards?
1. Why did the United States and Israel attack Iran?
The administration’s explanations have been inconsistent. At first Trump suggested that regime change in Tehran was the central objective. When it became clear that this would almost certainly require ground troops, he quickly shifted emphasis. The goals were now described as destroying Iran’s nuclear program, eliminating its long-range missile capabilities, and ending its support for militant groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen.
Behind the scenes, external pressure appears to have played an important role. According to credible media reports, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had been urging Trump for weeks to attack Iran. Their argument was straightforward: years of sanctions had weakened the Iranian economy, and the regime was politically vulnerable after violently suppressing domestic protests earlier this year. Israel has long regarded Iran as an existential enemy, and not without justification, while the rivalry between Tehran and Riyadh for regional dominance has shaped Middle Eastern politics for decades.
Netanyahu had tried to persuade the Biden administration to take similar action, but without success. Biden was too smart to fall for the Israeli Prime Minister’s overtures.
Trump, by contrast, appears to have been easier to convince. Recent developments reinforced his confidence: successful American-Israeli strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities in June of last year and the audacious kidnapping of Venezuela’s president in early January seemed to confirm his belief that America'’s military was invincible. Personal motives may also have played a role. Two Iranian assassination attempts against Trump in 2024 reportedly hardened his resolve to confront Tehran before its leadership could strike again.
The immediate trigger for the war was intelligence suggesting that much of Iran’s leadership would meet on Saturday, February 28, near the office of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Because nuclear negotiations with the United States were still underway, those attending apparently felt secure enough not to gather in a bunker. Shortly before 10 a.m., Israeli airstrikes hit the location, killing numerous senior officials, including Khamenei.
In the United States, the legality of the attack under international law has received surprisingly little scrutiny. The administration argues that Iran was preparing to attack an American military base in the Persian Gulf, thereby justifying a preemptive strike. So far, however, no evidence has been presented. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has also argued that an Israeli attack would inevitably have prompted Iranian retaliation against U.S. bases, forcing Washington to strike first. The argument is rather unconvincing. It also suggests that the United States may have allowed itself to be drawn into a major war by the strategic calculations of a foreign government.
2. How might the war develop?
For now, the United States and Israel appear committed to an escalating air campaign. American forces are focusing primarily on destroying Iran’s military infrastructure—particularly nuclear facilities and missile bases—while Israel is targeting senior political and military leaders as well as members of the Revolutionary Guards. At the same time, Israel continues its war against Hezbollah in Lebanon.
The combined air forces of the United States and Israel have already achieved air superiority over Iran and largely destroyed the Iranian navy. Yet both governments have so far ruled out deploying ground troops. Such a move would be politically explosive, especially in the United States. The war has already claimed American lives—six soldiers have been killed—and additional casualties could quickly deepen domestic opposition.
Nevertheless, senior officials suggest that the conflict will intensify further. Both Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth have indicated that the United States has not yet begun its most intensive bombing campaign.
Iran, meanwhile, is escalating in its own way. Tehran has intensified attacks on the oil-rich Gulf states and has largely succeeded in blocking the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz. The aim is clear: to disrupt global energy markets, pressure the Gulf monarchies, and raise the economic costs of the war for the United States and its allies. The surviving Iranian leadership—now mostly led by Security Minister Ali Ardashir Larijani—appears to believe that domestic political constraints or limited ammunition stocks will prevent Washington and Jerusalem from sustaining the war for more than a few weeks.
3. How will the war end?
On this crucial question, the Trump administration appears to have only vague ideas. Washington seems to hope that sustained bombing will trigger a popular uprising that will ultimately topple the Iranian regime. Yet even if such a collapse occurred, the aftermath would be highly uncertain. Iran’s opposition groups are numerous but deeply divided—politically, ideologically, and ethnically. Another option under discussion in Washington would be to install Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, the son of the last Shah, as the head of a transitional government. Pahlavi lives in Washington, D.C., but remains a controversial figure and commands only limited popular support in Iran.
A further possibility is the arming of Kurdish groups based in northern Iraq near the Iranian border. These forces could potentially wage a ground campaign against the clerical regime in Tehran. Yet such a strategy would provoke strong opposition from Turkey, a NATO ally that fears the emergence of an independent Kurdish state and has fought Kurdish movements for decades. The idea also evokes uncomfortable historical parallels. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration armed the Afghan Mujahideen to fight Soviet forces. Some of those fighters later evolved into extremist organizations—including the Taliban—which eventually killed many American soldiers during the long U.S. war in Afghanistan.
Outlook
Once the Iran war has ended, its consequences could be grim. Iran might follow the trajectory of Iraq after the 2003 U.S. invasion: prolonged instability, guerrilla warfare, weak governments, refugee flows toward Europe, and the rise of extremist movements.
There is also a more cynical—and perhaps more realistic—scenario. As in Venezuela, the United States might eventually reach an accommodation with the surviving elements of Iran’s theocratic regime in order to avoid the chaos of a power vacuum. Such an outcome would bring the war to an end without meaningful political change in Tehran. Trump, however, would almost certainly declare victory.
In that case, Trump’s war might appear militarily spectacular. Politically, however, it would amount to little more than another chapter in the long history of failed American interventions in the Middle East—interventions that have too often produced chaos, suffering, and long wars rather than stability, prosperity and pro-American governments.